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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW





HE Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc.1 will change summary judgment practice in federal
employment discrimination cases for Texas employment lawyers.
This is evident from cases already decided during the Survey period.
What is not evident-yet-is the extent of the change.
With respect to common law claims, Texas courts have had a year to
interpret a landmark case from the previous Survey period, GTE South-
west, Inc. v. Bruce,2 which breathed life into claims of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress ("IIED") in the employment setting. During
the Survey period, several courts evaluated the Bruce decision, however,
and the opinions do not suggest that every lIED claim will go to the jury.
Just as "getting to the jury" may have become easier due to decisions
like Reeves and Bruce, arbitration agreements, at least in Texas, are be-
coming unassailable. Several decisions in the Survey period reemphasize
that simply signing a document or attending a meeting may result in the
waiver of an individual's right to a jury.
These are just some of the noteworthy decisions discussed in this arti-
cle, which is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of all cases involving
employment or labor law issues. It is an update regarding cases of partic-
ular interest to the Texas-based employment law practitioner.
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Texas employment law practitioners are likely to see changes in the
way discrimination cases are handled at the summary judgment stage in
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Reeves. Reeves
overturned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to take away a
$100,000 jury verdict for the plaintiff in an age discrimination case. At
trial, the employer introduced evidence that it fired Reeves, age fifty-
seven at the time of his termination, for failing to keep accurate attend-
ance records of the employees he supervised. Reeves rebutted the evi-
dence by showing he had kept accurate records and that his supervisor
had displayed age-based discriminatory animus toward him. The Fifth
Circuit, relying on its "stray remarks" doctrine and determining that
there was insufficient evidence that the age-based remarks had been
made in the same context as his termination, held that Reeves had failed
to show his termination was related to his age. This was true, reasoned
the court, even if there was enough evidence to convince the jury that the
employer's stated reason was false. 3
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, resolved a split among the cir-
cuit courts of appeal over whether, to create a triable issue of fact, plain-
tiffs must prove merely that an employer's explanation for an adverse
employment action is "pretextual," or whether they must also provide
additional evidence showing that discrimination was the real reason for
the action. The Fifth, First, and Eleventh Circuits had previously taken
the position that merely showing that the employer's reason is false is not
enough; the plaintiff must have some additional proof of discrimination
to take the case to a jury. The Court disagreed, holding that "it is permis-
sible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from
the falsity of the employer's explanation."'4 The Court went on to state
that the Fifth Circuit had impermissibly substituted its own judgment for
the jury's concerning the weight of the evidence.
Thus, the Supreme Court has seemingly eliminated the "pretext-plus"
standard that had been adopted by the Fifth Circuit and, at least to some
extent, called into question the "stray remarks" doctrine heretofore
firmly established in the Fifth Circuit. As a result, Texas employment law
practitioners can expect federal employment discrimination case law after
Reeves to establish a trend toward fewer summary judgments and di-
rected verdicts for employers, although, as set forth in the case reviews
below, this trend was not readily evident in the first post-Reeves Fifth
Circuit decisions during the Survey period.5
3. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1999).
4. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 210.
5. See infra notes 55-68 for a discussion of these cases.
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The Fifth Circuit addressed the appropriate damages remedy for multi-
ple victims of discrimination who were seeking the same position in Ar-
nold v. United States Department of Interior.6 Three white male
applicants, Arnold, Maxwell, and McDaniel, alleged that they were dis-
criminatorily passed over for promotion on the basis of race, age, and
gender in favor of an Asian-American female. After an administrative
law judge found evidence of discrimination in the promotion decision, all
three men filed suit for gender and race discrimination under Title VII.
The female candidate then transferred to another job, leaving the posi-
tion vacant. The employer selected Maxwell for the vacant position.
The district court did not allow Arnold and McDaniel to put on evi-
dence of compensatory damages, ruling at a pretrial hearing that Max-
well's promotion prevented them from proving that they would have
been promoted "but for" discrimination. 7 At trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of all three plaintiffs, awarding $300,000 in compensatory
damages to Maxwell only. Although it was not given the option of
awarding compensatory damages to Arnold or McDaniel, the jury re-
jected the employer's "mixed motive" defense, i.e., that it would not have
promoted the other two men even absent any discriminatory motive.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of compensatory damages to the
other two candidates, relying on the "mixed- motive" provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.8 According to the court, the statute and appli-
cable case law plainly states that only individuals who can prove they
would have received the position but for discrimination may recover
compensatory damages. 9 Therefore, because the evidence established
that: 1) only one position was available; 2) only Arnold, Maxwell, and
McDaniel were considered; and 3) there was no evidence of discrimina-
tion in Maxwell's selection over the other men, the other two plaintiffs
could not show, as a matter of law, that they were entitled to compensa-
tory damages under Title VII.10
The Fifth Circuit ruled on a matter of first impression in Vielma v. Eu-
reka Co." regarding whether a notice of right to sue issued by the EEOC
triggered the sixty-day limitations period to file suit under section 21.254
of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. 12 Following the statu-
tory language, the court held that the sixty-day time limit under section
21.254 begins to run only when the Texas Commission on Human Rights
issues its own notice.' 3
6. 213 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2000).
7. Id. at 195.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
9. Arnold, 213 F.3d at 197.
10. Id.
11. 218 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2000).
12. TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.254 provides: "Within 60 days after the date a notice of
the right to file a civil action is received, the complainant may bring a civil action against
the respondent."
13. Vielma, 218 F.3d at 468.
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In another decision clarifying the statute of limitations period under
the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff filing suit under the
Act must also effectuate service of process within the limitations period.
In Roberts v. Padre Island Brewing Co.,14 the plaintiff filed her lawsuit
well within the sixty-day time period required by section 21.254 of the
Texas Labor Code. Because she failed to complete service on the defen-
dant until more than two months after the sixty-day period, however, the
court determined that she must prove that she used due diligence to have
the defendant served within the limitations period. Because the plaintiff
could not prove due diligence, the court held her cause of action was
barred by the statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. 15
2. Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment
Perhaps one of the more useful opinions for employment law practi-
tioners to come out during the Survey period was Casiano v. AT&T
Corp.'6 This was a Fifth Circuit decision appending a graphic entitled
"Supervisor Sexual Harassment Road Map" in an effort to "clarify a few
nuances that apparently continue to confound some litigants and trial
courts . . ." in sexual harassment cases. 17 Casiano sued AT&T, alleging
that his supervisor repeatedly made demeaning requests for personal and
sexual favors of him and that he suffered retaliation after he complained.
The district court granted AT&T's motion for summary judgment, finding
that Casiano unreasonably failed to complain about the alleged sexual
harassment until his lawyer wrote a letter to the company, and that Ca-
siano could not establish a causal nexus between his complaint and any
adverse employment action.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that Casiano could not
prove that he suffered a tangible employment action as a result of the
alleged harassment for purposes of imposing strict liability under the
Faragher/Ellerth standard. The court further held that although there was
a fact issue as to whether Casiano was actually subjected to a hostile work
environment, the evidence showed that Casiano unreasonably failed to
take advantage of the preventative and corrective opportunities afforded
by the company's written anti-harassment policy by neglecting to report
the alleged fifteen sexual propositions until months after they occurred.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the employer. 18 The court included a flow chart showing
the steps of its analysis for future guidance in applying the vicarious lia-
bility standards set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 9 and Burling-
14. 28 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).
15. Id. at 622.
16. 213 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2000).
17. Id. at 280.
18. Id. at 287.
19. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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ton Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.20
The Fifth Circuit held that an employer satisfied its requirement of tak-
ing "prompt remedial action" following a sexual harassment complaint in
Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc.21 The plaintiff argued
that her supervisor never investigated her harassment allegations until
months after the incident and after she had filed an EEOC charge; the
plaintiff also argued that her harasser was never reprimanded and that
she was never asked whether the conduct had ceased. The court, how-
ever, pointed to evidence that the supervisor had instructed the coworker
to leave the plaintiff alone, the coworker had been transferred to another
shift, the offensive conduct ceased after these actions, and the plaintiff
never reported any further complaints. The court held that these actions
satisfied the employer's obligation to take "prompt remedial action," thus
avoiding liability for coworker harassment under Title VII.22
Conversely, the Austin Court of Appeals held that an employer failed
to satisfy its obligation of "prompt remedial action" under the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Itz.2 3 In
that case, a female store employee complained of both "quid pro quo"
sexual harassment by her immediate supervisor and "hostile environ-
ment" sexual harassment by the store manager, whom she alleged failed
to abate the harassing conduct after he learned of it. The store manager's
testimony revealed that he completed his investigation of the complaint
within a day of receiving it and concluded based on this brief investiga-
tion that the employee's supervisor had done nothing wrong. According
to the appeals court, such a response is not the "prompt remedial action"
contemplated by the law, "which presupposes that sexual harassment or
some lesser form of 'wrongdoing' has been established and that a supervi-
sory employee has taken some action reasonably calculated to end it
commensurate with the seriousness of the conduct. '2 4 Because the store
manager's testimony established that he concluded the supervisor had not
committed sexual harassment-a conclusion that necessarily eliminated
the need for remedial action-the jury's finding that the employer failed
to take prompt remedial action was supported by the evidence. 25
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ad-
dressed the issue of harassment based on sexual orientation in Mims v.
Carrier Corp.26 A male employee alleged that his coworkers believed he
was homosexual and teased him about whether he was engaged in a ro-
mantic relationship with a male coworker. The court held that the em-
ployee could not establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under
Title VII, as he could not show that sexual orientation or "perceived"
20. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
21. 188 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1999).
22. Id. at 616.
23. 21 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. filed).
24. Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
25. Id.
26. 88 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
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sexual orientation were protected categories under Title VII. 27
The court then went on to address the plaintiff's allegation that the
harassment was based on his sex. The employer argued that, pursuant to
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,28 a same-sex harassment claim may be proven by showing
the following: (1) credible evidence that the harasser was a homosexual
and exhibited sexual desire toward the plaintiff; (2) evidence that the har-
asser treats another member of the same gender in such sex-specific and
derogatory terms that it is apparent that a general hostility toward mem-
bers of that gender is motivating the harasser; and (3) comparative evi-
dence showing how the alleged harasser treated members of both genders
in the workplace. 29
The evidence showed that the coworkers never expressed any sexual
interest in the plaintiff, that there was no discrimination generally against
men, that jokes about homosexuals were made in front of both genders,
and that the plaintiff was never touched or propositioned for sex. There-
fore, the plaintiff was unable to establish that the alleged harassment was
based on gender.30 These facts, in addition to evidence that the plaintiff
participated in the jokes, also led the court to conclude that the plaintiff
failed to establish that the teasing was severe and pervasive enough to
alter the terms and conditions of his employment or to create a hostile
work environment.31
Applying the Supreme Court's recently announced Kolstad v. Ameri-
can Dental Association32 standard for punitive damages in a gender dis-
crimination case, the Fifth Circuit reversed a jury's $100,000 punitive
damages award in Williams v. Trader Publishing Co. 33 Although the
court affirmed the jury's verdict finding that the plaintiff was fired be-
cause of a manager's gender bias, the court refused to impute the man-
ager's actions to the company for purposes of imposing punitive damages.
The court noted that the employer's liability for punitive damages de-
pended on whether the line manager who had the gender bias against the
plaintiff was acting as a managerial employee within his scope of employ-
ment when the discriminatory act occurred. Based on the holding of Kol-
stad, and because the evidence established that the discriminatory act
occurred when the plaintiff was fired, the court held that the answer to
this question was "no."'34
First, the evidence showed that the line manager, Haas, had no author-
ity to terminate the plaintiff. Rather, under the company hierarchy, the
final responsibility belonged to Haas's superior, Sunny Sonner. The court
27. Id. at 714.
28. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
29. See Mims, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 714-715 (citation omitted).
30. See id. at 715.
31. Id. at 716.
32. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
33. 218 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2000).
34. Id. at 487.
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cited to evidence that Sonner fired the plaintiff, not just because Haas
recommended it, but also because of her own independent investigation
and conclusions about the plaintiff's pattern of disruptive behavior.
Therefore, although Haas informed the plaintiff of her termination and
took credit for it, he was not the decision-maker in the termination.
Second, the court pointed out that there was no evidence that Sonner's
decision was motivated in any way by gender bias or that she ratified or
approved Haas's discriminatory treatment. Therefore, the court ruled
that under the holding in Kolstad, the line supervisor's misconduct could
not be imputed to the employer. 35
3. Disability Discrimination
In December of 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), recognizing the burgeoning contingent workforce, issued
new enforcement guidance36 clarifying how the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 apply to em-
ployers of contingent workers, such as temporary employment agencies
or contract firms. The guidance clarifies the EEOC's position that these
workers frequently qualify as the employees of both the staffing firm and
its client, thereby placing obligations on both entities to comply with the
provisions of the ADA.
The guidance addressed the following points of clarification with re-
gard to contingent workers and the ADA:
A staffing firm or its client may not ask disability-related questions or
require medical examinations until after an offer of employment with a
particular client has been made. The EEOC clarified that a staffing firm's
placement of someone on its roster for future consideration for assign-
ments is not considered an offer of employment.
Because a staffing firm is generally responsible for providing reasona-
ble accommodations for job applicants, the staffing firm and the client
will often both be responsible for providing accommodations needed on
the job.
Although the Enforcement Guidance does not have the force of law,
courts often look to the agency's interpretation of the statute as a starting
point in their legal analysis; thus, employment law practitioners should be
aware of the guidelines when advising clients utilizing contingent
workers.
The Fifth Circuit granted en banc review of Rizzo v. Children's World
Learning Centers, Inc. 37 to determine: (1) whether the trial court properly
instructed the jury on the proper burden of proof on the ADA "direct
threat" defense; and (2) whether the record supported the jury's verdict
35. Id. at 488.
36. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Application of the ADA to Contingent
Workers Placed by Temporary Agencies and Other Staffing Firms, No. 915.002 (Dec. 22,
2000) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/guidance-contingent.html.
37. 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc) [hereinafter Rizzo III].
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for the plaintiff. Rizzo, who was hearing impaired, complained that her
employer, a daycare center, discriminated against her because of her disa-
bility by removing her from her driving duties. The employer defended
its actions using the "direct threat" defense under the ADA, contending
that Rizzo's hearing impairment could keep her from safely supervising
her charges while driving the van. Rizzo 138 placed the burden of proof
for the direct threat defense on the employer, and the jury was so in-
structed, returning a $100,000 verdict in favor of Rizzo. In Rizzo I,39 a
panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the verdict.
The en banc majority, rather than directly addressing the burden of
proof issue as expected, instead ruled that the employer had not pre-
served the direct threat issue on appeal, as it had failed to object to the
direct threat jury charge. 40 The court further held that the district court's
imposition of the burden of proof on the employer was not "plain error,"
thus avoiding a decision on the proper burden of proof.
In another case addressing the "direct threat" defense, the Fifth Circuit
held that an employer could justify an across-the-board safety rule that
allegedly discriminated against reformed substance abusers by using the
"business necessity" standard rather than the direct threat standard. 41
The EEOC brought suit against Exxon under the ADA, claiming that
Exxon's substance abuse policy, established in the wake of the Exxon
Valdez oil tanker spill, unlawfully discriminated against individuals who
had previously undergone substance abuse treatment. The policy dic-
tated that certain positions designated as "safety sensitive" could not be
held by persons who had ever undergone any form of substance abuse
treatment.
In response to the EEOC's suit, Exxon presented the affirmative de-
fense of business necessity,42 contending that its policy was created to
address the legitimate business concern of safety. The EEOC argued that
Exxon was not allowed to take shelter in the "business necessity" defense
under the ADA, and that a safety justification must necessarily fall under
the more stringent "direct threat" standard. 43 The Fifth Circuit agreed
with Exxon's position, holding that an employer may attempt to justify a
safety-based policy that has an adverse impact on disabled employees us-
ing the business necessity defense under the ADA, rather than the direct
threat defense. 44
In Mclnnis v. Alamo Community College District,45 the Fifth Circuit
vacated a summary judgment decision in favor of the employer because
of factual issues surrounding the employer's reason for terminating the
38. 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996).
39. 173 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 1999).
40. See Rizzo III, 213 F.3d at 213 & n.4.
41. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1999).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1999).
44. Exxon, 203 F.3d at 875.
45. 207 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2000).
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teaching contract of the plaintiff, a disabled faculty member. McInnis,
who had suffered a severe head injury many years before, continued to
experience permanent impairments including slurred speech, walking
with a limp, a language communication disorder, and partial paralysis of
his right side. McInnis never requested or felt the need for any accom-
modation to perform his responsibilities.
The college transferred McInnis to a new position, reportedly because
the banking program he administered was "not functioning well" and be-
cause he "had a handicap that may have contributed to" the problem. 46
In addition, a student complained to the college that McInnis was intoxi-
cated in class. The college investigated, based on the student's reported
observations of McInnis's slurred speech, unsteady gait, bloodshot eyes,
and pauses during his lecture. Because the administration was aware of
the physical effects of McInnis' previous head injury, however, it dis-
missed the student's complaint as being without merit.
When his teaching contract was not renewed, McInnis filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that he had been discriminated
against on the basis of a perceived disability. The decision-maker stated
in his deposition that there were two reasons why he did not want to
renew McInnis's contract: (1) a letter to him from the chairman of a pro-
gram jointly administered between the American Institute of Banking
and the college, stating that the program had improved since McInnis had
transferred out of it and that the board would "rethink" its relationship
with the college if McInnis were returned; and (2) the allegation that Mc-
Innis taught a class while intoxicated.47 The magistrate judge concluded
that McInnis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA since he neither was nor was regarded as disabled. The magis-
trate judge concluded that the employer had presented legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for terminating McInnis' employment.
The Fifth Circuit found two material fact issues concerning the col-
lege's stated reasons for McInnis' termination.48 First, the court found
that the allegations of poor performance were no longer relevant at the
time the college decided not to renew McInnis' contract. Mclnnis had
been transferred to a new position one and a half years before his termi-
nation and had received outstanding performance reviews as an instruc-
tor during that time period. Moreover, because both of the reasons given
for the nonrenewal of McInnis' contract were factually related to the al-
leged perceived disabilities, the court determined that a reasonable jury
could infer from the evidence presented that McInnis' contract was can-
celled because his employer regarded him as disabled. Second, because
the reasons for termination advanced by the college in its EEOC re-
sponse were inconsistent with the evidence in the summary judgment re-
cord, the court held that there was sufficient evidence presented to create
46. Id. at 278.
47. Id. at 279.
48. Id. at 283-84.
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a fact issue as to whether the employer's stated reasons or illegal discrimi-
nation motivated the decision not to renew McInnis' contract.
The First District of the Houston Court of Appeals held in Morrison v.
Pinkerton, Inc. 49 that an employee who claimed to be "morbidly obese"
was not disabled under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.
The plaintiff alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the
basis of his condition by transferring him from his position as a bank se-
curity guard to another position at reduced pay. The employee claimed
that his obesity affected his respiratory system, including his ability to
walk, run, or climb stairs without becoming tired or out of breath. The
court held that these facts, even if true, did not sufficiently distinguish the
plaintiff from the general population to demonstrate an impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity. 50 The court noted that although
morbid obesity might be a disability under some facts, the plaintiff's testi-
mony and expert evidence was insufficient to show that he was disabled
or "regarded as" disabled. 51
An employee's depression was held not to be a substantial limitation of
a major life activity by the Amarillo Court of Appeals in Hartis v. Mason
& Hanger Corp.52 Upon the plaintiff's return from a five-month leave of
absence, the employer discharged him for misconduct, including verbal
abuse and harassment of coworkers, that had occurred just before he
went on leave. The plaintiff alleged that his depression, for which he re-
ceived treatment during his period of leave, had caused the misconduct.
The plaintiff sued, alleging that he was fired because of his disability.
The court noted that chronic depression had been held to be a disabil-
ity under the ADA. However, because the employee's medical records
showed that his doctors released him to work after his period of leave
without work restrictions, and because he failed to establish that his de-
pression caused his five-month absence from work, the court determined
that the plaintiff had not established that he was substantially limited in
the major life activity of working for purposes of establishing a
disability.53
4. Race and National Origin Discrimination
The Fifth Circuit seemingly downplayed the effect of Reeves v. Sander-
son Plumbing Products, Inc.54 in the Title VII national origin discrimina-
tion case of Vadie v. Mississippi State University.55 Vadie, an Iranian
professor, alleged that the university failed to hire him for a faculty posi-
tion because of his ancestry. Vadie established a prima facie case of na-
tional origin discrimination, which the university rebutted with a
49. 7 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
50. Id. at 857.
51. Id. at 858.
52. 7 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
53. Id. at 704-705.
54. See supra notes 3-5.
55. 218 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2000).
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Despite Vadie's evidence that the
person hired for the position he sought was not as qualified as he, the
court held that he had failed to present any evidence that his national
origin played a role in his nonselection.5 6 Somewhat surprisingly, the
court noted in a footnote that the Reeves opinion did not alter Fifth Cir-
cuit precedent setting forth the correct standards for creating a jury issue
on discrimination.57 Applying the rule expressed several years ago in
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 58 the court set aside the jury's verdict for
Vadie on the discrimination issue, holding that Vadie had not put forth
sufficient evidence of discrimination such that a rational fact finder could
decide in his favor. 59 The court then affirmed the jury's award of com-
pensatory damages on Vadie's retaliation claim but held the $300,000
awarded to be excessive, absent any medical evidence of injury or other
evidence of emotional injury. The court ordered a new trial on the dam-
ages issue alone, contingent on Vadie's agreement to a remittitur reduc-
ing the award to $10,000. 60
In another opinion closely following on the heels of the Supreme
Court's Reeves decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment
in another national origin discrimination claim and remitted a jury's puni-
tive damages award on the plaintiff's retaliation claim in Rubenstein v.
Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund.61 Rubenstein, a Russian
Jew, claimed that Tulane University had discriminated against him be-
cause of his national origin by denying him a promotion and later retali-
ated against him for lodging a complaint of discrimination by denying him
a raise. He presented evidence that faculty members made comments
that he was a "Russian Yankee," that Jews were thrifty or frugal, and that
if a Russian Jew could obtain tenure, "anyone could."'62 The court held
that there was no evidence that these remarks were related to the deci-
sion to deny Rubenstein the promotion he sought, despite the fact that
some of the remarks were made by the relevant decision-makers. 63 In so
holding, the court applied and reaffirmed the four-part "stray remarks"
test announced in Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc.,64 seemingly ignoring the
Supreme Court's questioning of this doctrine in Reeves.
At trial, Rubenstein was awarded $2,500 in compensatory damages on
his retaliation claim, and $75,000 in punitive damages. Reviewing these
awards, the court first rejected Tulane's punitive damages Kolstad de-
fense.65 The court found no evidence that Tulane had made good faith
efforts to comply with Title VII and found malice in testimony by a col-
56. Id. at 373.
57. Id. at 373, n.23.
58. 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996).
59. Vadie, 218 F.3d at 374.
60. Id. at 378.
61. 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000).
62. Id. at 400.
63. Id. at 401.
64. 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996).
65. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 526.
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lege dean that he denied the plaintiff a raise because he "hauled col-
leagues into court to try to resolve differences. ' 66 Nevertheless, the court
rejected as excessive the jury's award of a 30-to-1 ratio of punitive dam-
ages to compensatory damages, ruling that the amount of damages did
not bear a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages awarded
under the standards set forth in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.67
As a result, the court remitted the punitive damages award to $25,000,
reflecting a 10-to-1 ratio.
Employers with blanket "English-only" policies should be aware of a
recent decision by the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas. In E.E.O.C. v. Premier Operator Services, Inc.,68 the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission challenged such a policy in a class
action lawsuit, arguing that the policy, which prohibited all employees
from speaking any language other than English in the workplace except
to non-English speaking customers, fulfilled no legitimate business need
and had a disparate impact on Hispanic workers. The EEOC's "English-
only" regulations presume that an employer has engaged in discrimina-
tion when it applies its "English-only" policy at all times.69 The court
rejected the employer's argument that its legitimate business needs in-
cluded improving its employees' English skills, allowing managers to
oversee their employees more effectively, creating harmony in the work-
place, and addressing complaints by non-Spanish-speaking employees
that Spanish speaking employees were ridiculing them. Because there
was a fact issue as to whether these reasons required the English-only
rule to be applied at all times, including at lunch and during breaks, the
court concluded that it could not decide at the summary judgment stage
that the employer's reasons for the policy were legitimate and
nondiscriminatory.70
After a later bench trial,71 the district court entered judgment for the
EEOC, enjoining the employer (which was in bankruptcy proceedings)
from enacting any policy in the future that prohibits the speaking of a
language other than English at all times in the workplace. The court also
granted individual class members back pay totaling approximately
$60,000. Finally, the court found that the employer's actions indicating its
intent to discharge employees who opposed unlawful employment prac-
tices and to terminate employees for filing EEOC charges, followed by its
instructions to add backdated reprimands into the charging parties' files,
entitled the EEOC to a judgment of $650,000 in compensatory and puni-
tive damages on behalf of the terminated employees. 72
66. Rubenstein, 218 F.3d at 406.
67. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
68. 75 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
69. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
70. Premier, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
71. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
72. Id. at 1078.
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Applying the Faragher/Ellerth73 vicarious liability analysis to racial har-
assment in Walker v. Thompson,74 the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, Glasfloss
Industries, Inc. The plaintiffs, two African-American females, alleged
that they had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on
their race by being compared to "slaves" and "monkeys," being derided
because of their African heritage, suffering offensive remarks about their
hair, and hearing a coworker and a supervisor use the word "nigger. '75
The women also alleged that management did not want them talking to
each other at work.
The court determined that whether these racial insults were sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of their employment was a fact
issue for the jury.76 The court also found disputed fact issues concerning
the employer's assertion of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. The
court noted under the first prong of the defense that there was no proce-
dure in place for handling race discrimination complaints, that the person
responsible for investigating the complaints had allegedly taken part in
the racial insults, and that the investigation was incomplete and seemingly
ignored relevant events and comments by the employees involved.77 Fur-
thermore, the court refused to characterize the plaintiffs' refusal to agree
to a settlement proposal put forth by the EEOC as unreasonably failing
to mitigate or avoid harm under the second prong of the defense. 78
Reflecting a departure from its recent opinion in Nieto v. L & H Pack-
ing Co.,79 the Fifth Circuit in Byers v. Dallas Morning News8° held that a
plaintiff was required to establish, as part of his prima facie case of re-
verse race discrimination, that he was replaced by someone outside his
protected category. Byers, who was a white employee reporting to an
African-American supervisor, alleged that his termination was motivated
by reverse race discrimination. The Fifth Circuit held that Byers had
failed to state a prima facie case of reverse discrimination.
The court set forth the following elements, which it held the plaintiff
must satisfy to prove his case: 1) that he was a member of a protected
group; 2) that he was qualified for the position he held; 3) that he was
discharged; and 4) that he was replaced by someone outside the protected
group.81 As to the first prong, the court noted that some Fifth Circuit
cases have required that a plaintiff be a member of a "racial minority
within the company," while more recent decisions have required only that
the plaintiff be a member of "a protected group," meaning any group
73. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
74. 214 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 2000).
75. Id. at 626.
76. Id. at 627.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 627-28.
79. 108 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 1997).
80. 209 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2000).
81. Id. at 426.
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protected under Title VII.82 Because the court found that the more re-
cent case law marked a retreat from the "racial minority" requirement in
favor of the "protected group" requirement for cases of reverse discrimi-
nation, Byers could establish the first prong without establishing that he
was a racial minority in his workplace.8 3
The fourth element of the prima facie case had previously been ad-
dressed in Nieto, in which the court had observed that replacement by a
member outside the protected class was not necessarily an indispensable
element of a prima facie case. 84 The Byers opinion seems to suggest oth-
erwise, although it is unclear to what extent this issue affected the out-
come, as the court went on to state that Byers, besides not being able to
show that he had been replaced by a non-white employee, had also failed
to offer any other evidence of discriminatory intent to support his theory
of race discrimination.
The Texas Supreme Court applied the "stray remarks" doctrine in a
Texas Commission on Human Rights Act case and upheld a summary
judgment for the employer in M.D. Anderson Hospital & Tumor Institute
v. Willrich.85 The plaintiff alleged that racially derogatory comments
were made by supervisors and coworkers of the plaintiff over a period of
fourteen years. Noting that the most recent of these remarks was made
five years prior to the plaintiff's termination in a reduction in force, that
the supervisor who made the remark issued a written apology for it, and
that the supervisor played no part in the selection of employees to be laid
off, the court held that the plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the employer's reason for laying off the plain-
tiff was actually a pretext for race discrimination.8 6
In a race discrimination case involving disciplinary action for drug use,
the Waco Court of Appeals upheld a verdict in the plaintiff's favor in
Northwestern Resources Co. v. Banks.8 7 The plaintiff, who admitted to
the off-duty use of illegal drugs, was subjected to a series of random drug
tests by his employer and eventually discharged when he admitted that he
had resumed the use of drugs while off work. Despite the evidence of the
violation of the employer's drug policy, the court held that there was suf-
ficient evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of the plaintiff's race
to support judgment for the plaintiff.88 First, there was evidence that the
employer did not require white employees who were admitted drug users
to submit to random drug testing. Moreover, others had been offered the
opportunity to resign in lieu of termination. Also, white employees who
used drugs were given better opportunities for rehabilitation. These facts
constituted sufficient evidence of discrimination to uphold the verdict for
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Nieto, 108 F.3d at 624.
85. 28 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2000).
86. Id. at 25.
87. 4 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, pet. denied).
88. Id. at 98.
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the plaintiff.8 9
5. Age Discrimination
State employees may no longer sue their employers under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act after the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.90 The Court held that,
although the ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, Congress did not have the au-
thority to do so under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 It is
important to note, however, that state employees are protected against
age discrimination by the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and
may bring suit against an agency or instrumentality of State of Texas
under that statute.92
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made key evidentiary rulings and
applied its "stray remarks" doctrine in Wyvill v. United Companies Life
Insurance Co.93 The court held that the district court abused its discre-
tion by admitting anecdotal testimony of several witnesses who testified
that they, too, believed that they had been subjected to age discrimina-
tion by their employer. Because the evidence established that the wit-
nesses were not similarly situated to the plaintiffs (i.e., they did not work
in the same division, were supervised by different managers, held differ-
ent positions, and were terminated under different circumstances), the
trial court should have excluded the testimony. 94 The court stated that,
by admitting the anecdotal evidence, the district court had substantially
prejudiced the employer and created several "trials within a trial."95
The court then analyzed the remaining evidence of discrimination, in-
cluding age-related remarks made by one of the decision-makers who ter-
minated the plaintiffs. Because the remarks were remote in time and
were not directed at the plaintiffs, the court determined that they were
not probative on the issue of age discrimination. 96 The plaintiffs also
failed to establish that the differential treatment they alleged was linked
to their ages, or that they were similarly situated to the younger employ-
ees whom they alleged were treated more favorably. Accordingly, the
court determined that, after excluding the improperly admitted evidence,
the plaintiffs had failed to carry their evidentiary burden.
In a TCHRA age discrimination case, Anderson v. Taylor Publishing
Co.,97 a discharged employee claimed that his employer retained
89. Id.
90. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
91. Id. at 67.
92. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.002(8)(D) (Vernon 1999) provides that an "employer" in-
cludes "a county, municipality, state agency, or state instrumentality, including a public
institution of education, regardless of the number of individuals employed."
93. 212 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 303-04.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 13 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
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younger, less qualified workers after a reduction in force. The Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the employee failed to overcome the em-
ployer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for retaining the younger
workers, even though the employee showed that the younger workers re-
quired training to take over some of the duties he had previously per-
formed. The court held that, to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff
must be able to show that he was "clearly better qualified" than the re-
tained employees.98 Citing several Fifth Circuit decisions, the court
stated that "the evidence must demonstrate that the decision to retain a
younger worker instead of an older one was more than a bad business
decision. The evidence must show a mistake of judgment large enough
that one may wonder whether it was a mistake at all." 99
Because, as the court stated, years of experience do not necessarily
equate to superior qualifications, and employment decisions may be
made on the basis of cost savings for employees with less tenure, the
plaintiff had failed to make this showing with respect to the retained em-
ployees. Moreover, the court rejected the employee's argument that a
comment during a company meeting, raising general concerns about the
number of employees with many years of service being terminated,
showed discriminatory age-based animus. Concluding that Taylor
presented sufficient evidence to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for discharging Anderson and that Anderson failed to present any
probative evidence showing that Taylor's proffered reason for Ander-
son's termination was a pretext for age discrimination, the court affirmed
summary judgment for the employer. 100
Although Texas courts have lately shown an increased focus on the
consistency, across time, of an employer's explanation of its reasons for
taking a challenged employment action in discrimination cases, 1° 1 such
inconsistency is not invariably fatal to the employer's defense. For exam-
ple, in Jaso v. Travis County Juvenile Board, the Austin Court of Appeals
determined that the fifty-eight-year-old plaintiff failed to offer any proba-
tive evidence showing that the employer's reasons for hiring a forty-year-
old candidate were false or a pretext for age discrimination. 10 2 Accord-
ingly, evidence that one member of the selection committee told the
plaintiff that the successful candidate was selected because of her commu-
nity service, while the entire committee later referred to the successful
candidate's superior qualifications, vision, and leadership as the reasons
for selection, was not enough to rebut the employer's proffered reasons
98. Id. at 59 (quoting Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 42 (5th Cir.
1996)).
99. Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted).
100. Id. at 58.
101. See, e.g., Mclnnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding
that a discrepancy between employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons at the EEOC
charge stage and the stated reasons during litigation raised a fact issue as to whether the
reasons were a pretext for discrimination, thus precluding summary judgment for the
employer).
102. 6 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
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and establish discrimination. 10 3
The Amarillo Court of Appeals determined in Hartis v. Mason &
Hanger Corp. that a former employee who was a mere three years older
than an employee and who allegedly received more favorable treatment
did not demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination.10 4 A mere
three years difference in age was not considered significant enough to
establish an inference of discrimination. 0 5
6. Religious Discrimination and Harassment
A truck driver sued his employer under Title VII in Weber v. Roadway
Express, Inc.,106 claiming that he was unlawfully denied a religious ac-
commodation and discharged. The plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, ob-
jected on religious grounds to being scheduled by the employer to make
"overnight runs" with women drivers. The company refused the plain-
tiff's request to skip over any such assignments and terminated him when
he refused to drive as scheduled.
Affirming the grant of summary judgment for the employer, the Fifth
Circuit defined the issue as to whether the plaintiff's requested accommo-
dation of skipping over certain driving assignments would have subjected
the employer to an "undue hardship." The court concluded that the sug-
gested accommodation would indeed have been an undue hardship, as it
would have required other drivers to take the plaintiff's assignments on a
regular basis, whenever he was scheduled to drive an overnight run with a
woman driver.10 7 According to the court, the employer was required
only to establish the possibility of an adverse impact on other workers to
establish an undue hardship under Title VII. 1 0 8
In Grant v. Joe Myers Toyota, Inc.,'0 9 a job applicant sued for religious
discrimination under the TCHRA, claiming that a sales training manual
she was required to read was hostile to her Christian beliefs and that she
was unlawfully refused employment because of her religious beliefs.
Grant, the plaintiff, went to the Joe Myers Toyota dealership seeking cler-
ical employment. When informed that the only open positions were in
sales, Grant agreed to attend a two-week, sales-training course required
for applicants with no previous sales training.
The class materials provided for the training course included a book
entitled The Greatest Salesman in the World, by Og Mandino. The course
instructor asked the class to read certain passages from the book and re-
cite them three times a day. Grant, finding that the passages interfered
with her Christian beliefs and practices, told the instructor that she could
not read the book because of her religious beliefs. She was then dis-
103. Id. at 327.
104. 7 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
105. Id. at 705.
106. 199 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2000).
107. Id. at 274.
108. Id.
109. 11 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
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missed from the class. After reporting the problem to a sales manager at
Joe Myers Toyota, Grant was told that she must read the book and take
the class in order to be hired.
The court adopted the EEOC's established definition of "religion" and
held that under that definition, Grant had provided more than a scintilla
of proof that: she held a bona fide religious belief; she believed the em-
ployer's training materials interfered with that belief; and she was denied
an accommodation of her beliefs. Accordingly, the court reversed the
trial court's no-evidence summary judgment on the plaintiff's TCHRA
claim and allowed her case to go to a jury." 0
7. Title VII and TCHRA Retaliation
In Walker v. Thompson,' discussed above, although the plaintiffs' ra-
cial harassment claims survived summary judgment, their retaliation
claims did not. The Fifth Circuit rejected these claims, finding no adverse
employment action in the record. The plaintiffs' allegations of the re-
moval of a major account, restrictions on the timing of work breaks, and a
single improper overtime deduction of $2.89 did not rise to the level of
actionable conduct necessary to state a claim of retaliation under Title
VII.112
The El Paso Court of Appeals focused on the evidence required to
prove a causal connection between protected conduct and an alleged re-
taliatory act by an employer in Marsaglia v. University of Texas.113 The
plaintiff, a professor seeking tenure at the University of Texas, introduced
evidence that she received excellent performance evaluations each year
and recommendations for tenure from her department, dean, and tenure
committee. However, the final decision was made by the president of the
university, who denied tenure. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the denial
of tenure was in retaliation for a sexual harassment complaint she had
lodged against another professor.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the university, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation.114 Specifically, the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish the causation element because she was unable to present evidence
sufficient to establish that the decision-maker was aware of her sexual
harassment complaint when he denied her tenure.115
110. Id. at 424.
111. 214 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 2000).
112. Id. at 629.
113. 22 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied). This case was decided on
August 26, 1999 but not released for publication until August 1, 2000.
114. See id. at 5.
115. Id.
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B. WORKERS' COMPENSATION RETALIATION
The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, considered whether an
employer had provided "unequivocal notice" of termination to an em-
ployee for purposes of triggering the two-year statute of limitations under
Texas Labor Code Section 451.001 in Reeves v. Houston Lighting &
Power Co.116 The employer sent the plaintiff a letter informing him that
he had exhausted his paid leave and would be discharged after exhausting
his thirty days of unpaid leave, unless he applied for and received ap-
proval for an extended leave of absence. The court held that the letter
triggered the plaintiff's two-year statute of limitations period although it
occurred before his actual termination, because it unequivocally notified
the plaintiff that he would be terminated if he failed to successfully apply
for leave. 117
In another Section 451 case, Chemicals, Inc. v. Holland,"18 the appel-
late court allowed a nonsubscribing employer to argue for the first time
on appeal that it did not meet the definition of "employer" under the
Workers' Compensation Act and therefore could not be held liable under
Section 451. Although the plaintiffs objected to the belated raising of the
defense, the court allowed it, noting that the plaintiffs had alleged the
defendant's nonsubscriber status in their own pleadings, thereby remov-
ing any requirement by the employer to allege, plead or prove its nonsub-
scriber status.119
C. OTHER WORKERS' COMPENSATION Acr CLAIMS: NONSUBSCRIBERS
The Texas Supreme Court, in Kroger Co. v. Keng,120 issued a ruling
that a nonsubscribing employer loses not only the affirmative defense of
contributory negligence, 121 but also loses its rights to reduce a finding of
negligence against the employer by the proportionate responsibility of
the employee for causing the injury.1 22 The court's rationale was that the
only way for the jury to consider an employee's proportionate responsi-
bility for an injury was to consider the employee's own negligence, an
inquiry that is prohibited by Section 406.033 of the Texas Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 123
During the Survey period, Texas courts continued to see a good deal of
litigation about whether and under what circumstances an employer who
elects to opt out of the workers' compensation system may request em-
116. 4 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
117. See id. at 378.
118. No. 14-97-01402-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 7658 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 14, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
119. Id. at *6.
120. 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000).
121. Id. at 352; see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a)(1) (Vernon 1996).
122. Kroger, 23 S.W.3d at 352; see also TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.002(c)(1) (Vernon 1997).
123. Kroger, 23 S.W.3d at 352; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (Vernon 1996); see




ployees to waive common law rights prospectively in return for private
health benefits. In Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc.,124 the employer
opted out of the workers' compensation system and offered its employees
the option of waiving any future claims of negligence against it in ex-
change for medical and income benefits in connection with workplace in-
juries. The plaintiff, Gary Lawrence, executed the waiver and was later
injured in a work accident.
Lawrence filed suit against CDB for negligence, asserting that the
waiver should not be enforced, as it was void as a matter of public policy
and did not satisfy the express negligence doctrine. 125 The Amarillo
Court of Appeals held that the employer's benefit plan did not violate
Texas law and that a knowing waiver of rights should not be void as a
matter of public policy. The court also held that the waiver and election
of rights met the express negligence and conspicuousness requirements
under state law. 126 Accordingly, summary judgment for the employer
was upheld.
Similarly, in Wolfe v. C.S.P.H., Inc.,127 the employer opted out of the
Texas workers' compensation system and implemented a private program
to compensate employees for work-related injuries. After being injured
on the job, Kevin Wolfe sued his employer, C.S.P.H. d/b/a Domino's
Pizza, for negligence. C.S.P.H. moved for summary judgment, contend-
ing that the employee had waived his right to sue for negligence by elect-
ing to receive benefits under C.S.P.H.'s private compensation plan.
When Wolfe began working for C.S.P.H., he elected to participate in
C.S.P.H.'s benefits program and executed a waiver of his right to sue
C.S.P.H. that stated:
In consideration of this election to become eligible to receive addi-
tional medical, income, dismemberment, and death benefits under
the plan, I hereby waive my rights under the act, any other statute, or
common law, to bring legal action and recover judgment against
[C.S.P.H.] ... for any damages arising from any personal injury in-
curred (i) in the course of my employment by [C.S.P.H.], and (ii)
during my participation in the plan or by reason of death resulting
from such injury.
After Wolfe was injured, C.S.P.H. paid Wolfe enhanced benefits for
over eighteen months.
The court began its analysis by noting that an agreement by an em-
ployee to waive rights under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act is
void.128 Nevertheless, the court followed other recent cases holding that
Texas Labor Code Section 406.035 does not apply to employees of non-
124. 16 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000), affd, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 554 (Tex. 2001).
125. Id. at 38, 44 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex.
1987)).
126. Id. at 30 (citing Ethyl, supra note 122, and Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum,
Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993)).
127. 24 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.).
128. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.035 (Vernon 1996).
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subscribers. 129 The court held that because nonsubscribers' employees
are not entitled to benefits under the Act, the provisions of Section
406.035 do not apply to waiver agreements by employees of nonsubscrib-
ers. 130 The court also dismissed Wolfe's contention that the waiver vio-
lated the public policy of Texas.131
In the case of In re H.E. Butt Grocery Co.,1 32 Perry Swinton signed an
agreement upon hire, which waived his right to sue H.E. Butt Grocery
Company ("HEB") for negligence in return for benefits in connection
with a workplace injury. HEB had opted out of the Texas workers' com-
pensation system and offered employees two levels of benefits for work-
place injuries. The "basic" plan provided minimal benefits but allowed
employees to retain their common law rights to sue for negligence. Swin-
ton elected the "comprehensive" coverage, which required him not only
to waive his right to sue HEB for negligence and release HEB from ex-
isting and future claims for occupational injury, death or disease, but also
required him to arbitrate any disputes under the plan pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act.
After Swinton was injured, he filed a personal injury lawsuit against
HEB. HEB filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court
denied. HEB then filed a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling
the trial court to grant its motion to compel arbitration. In arguing that
the trial court had not abused its discretion, Swinton raised several issues
with the court of appeals, including arguments that the benefit agreement
was illegal, that it was illusory, that it was unconscionable, that he was
fraudulently induced into signing the agreement, and that it was void as a
matter of public policy.
Swinton alleged that the agreement was illegal because the Texas Ad-
ministrative Code prohibits the sale of substitute workers' compensation
policies without specific disclaimer language.133 The court held that HEB
did not sell insurance; rather, HEB gave Swinton the option to select ben-
efits under a plan funded by a company-created trust and administered by
a qualified trustee. Consequently, the agreement was not illegal. 134
The court also held that the benefit agreement was not illusory. The
court defined an illusory promise as one that "fails to bind the promisor,
who retains the option of discontinuing performance. 1 135 The court re-
129. Wolfe, 24 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Reyes v. Storage and Processors, Inc., 995 S.W.2d
722 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied)); see Martinez v. 1BP, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 678
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
130. 24 S.W.3d at 644.
131. Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc., 16 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000), affd,
44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 554 (Tex. 2001); but see Reyes, 995 S.W.2d at 727 (a nonsubscriber's
voluntary workers' compensation plan is enforceable and not contrary to public policy only
if the employer's plan provides benefits equal to or greater than those provided under the
act).
132. 17 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
133. Id. at 367; see 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.6302.
134. See H.E. Butt Grocery, 17 S.W.3d at 369.
135. Id. at 370 (citing Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1994)).
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jected Swinton's interpretation of the contract and held that the benefit
agreement was not illusory. Likewise, the court held that the agreement
was not an unconscionable contract of adhesion. In determining whether
arbitration is proper, the court focused only on whether the agreement
was "procured in an unconscionable manner."'1 36 The court rejected affi-
davits of three other HEB employees who provided testimony surround-
ing the conditions of their execution of the benefit agreement. The court
held that the determination of unconscionability must be on an individ-
ual, case-by-case basis.' 37 Although Swinton testified that he was di-
rected to sign the agreement without a full opportunity to read or discuss
the agreement, the court held that the trial court should not have consid-
ered this parol evidence in light of the unambiguous terms of the benefit
agreement. The agreement contained language that Swinton had entered
into the agreement "voluntarily without duress or coercion" and that he
had been given the opportunity to discuss this agreement "with his or her
private legal counsel and has availed himself or herself of that opportu-
nity .... -"138 On these facts, the court held that the plain and unambigu-
ous terms of the benefit agreement were not unconscionable and that
Swinton had willingly agreed to arbitration. 139
Turning to the public policy issue, the court held that an employer did
not violate the public policy of Texas by opting out of the Texas Workers'
Compensation system and instituting a private plan by which employees
would be compensated for workplace injuries in return for an execution
of a waiver of any rights to sue for common law negligence. 140 The court
did, however, state that if the benefits under the employer's private plan
were substantially less than the benefits provided under the Texas Work-
ers' Compensation Act, such a plan may violate the public policy of
Texas.' 4 ' The court then compared the benefits under HEB's plan and
held that it "compared favorably" to those provided under the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act. 142 Because the agreement to arbitrate was
enforceable, the court granted the writ of mandamus and directed the
trial court to grant HEB's motion to compel arbitration. 43
D. TEXAS WHISTLEBLOWER ACT CLAIMS
In a Whistleblower Act 144 case, a City of Fort Worth deputy marshal,
Julius Zimlich, found evidence of illegal dumping of toxic waste on prop-
erty that turned out to be owned by a former city council member. 145
Zimlich's supervisor ordered him to stop the investigation. Zimlich then
136. Id. at 371.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 371-72.
139. Id.
140. H.E. Butt Grocery, 17 S.W.3d at 374.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 375.
143. Id. at 378.
144. TEX. GOVT CODE §§ 554.001-.009 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
145. City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tex. 2000).
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discussed the site with a television station whose report led to a state
inspection, concluding that hazardous solid waste had been illegally
dumped on the site. Zimlich's supervisor eventually assigned him to a
low-level security position "usually designated for rookies and retir-
ees." 146 Zimlich also sought and was denied promotion. At trial, the jury
awarded Zimlich $200.00 for lost earnings in the past, $300,000 for lost
earnings in the future, $300,000 for mental anguish, and $1,500,000 in pu-
nitive damages. After the court of appeals affirmed the judgment, the
Texas Supreme Court considered whether the evidence was legally suffi-
cient to support the jury's finding that Zimlich's report was the "cause" of
any discrimination.
The court held that the supervisor's prior practice of rotating officers,
usually rookies, to the security position and a comment by the supervisor
that Zimlich was "lucky to have a job at all" was sufficient evidence for a
jury to conclude that his report of the illegal conduct was the cause of his
assignment to the security duty post.147 Neither the court nor the parties
raised the issue of whether such a transfer amounted to an ultimate em-
ployment action.
The court further held that there was no evidence to support the con-
clusion that the delay in Zimlich being selected for a promotion was caus-
ally related to his protected activity. 148 The court noted that there was no
evidence linking the supervisor, even though he was on the selection
panel, to the decision not to promote Zimlich or that less qualified candi-
dates were promoted instead of Zimlich. The court also rejected, on
these facts, the "conduit theory" of causation under which an employer
can unlawfully discriminate if an innocent decision-maker unknowingly
acts on the bad motives of another supervisor. 149
Finally, the court struck the lost pay damage award, remanded for re-
consideration of the emotional damage award, and reversed and ren-
dered the punitive damage award.150 The court combed the record for
evidence of malice by the person who made the retaliatory decision to
assign Zimlich to security duty and found none. Because there was no
evidence of such malice in the record, the court reversed the $1.5 million
punitive damages award. 151
In Schindley v. Northeast Texas Community College,152 the Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that the limitations period for a Whistleblower Act
claim begins to run when the plaintiff receives "unequivocal notice" of
her termination, even if the termination occurs after the notice. The
plaintiff, Schindley, was assigned to work on a temporary project subject
to grant funds. After she allegedly reported illegal activity by her em-
146. Id.
147. Id. at 69.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 70.
150. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 74.
151. Id. at 74.
152. 13 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).
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ployer, she was informed that her employment would cease on a particu-
lar date, when the grant funding ran out. Despite the plaintiff's
arguments that she might later have been transferred to a different pro-
ject funded by another grant, the court held that when she was informed
of the pending termination of her project, she was put on unequivocal
notice that she would be terminated, thus starting the running of the limi-
tations period. 153 Because her lawsuit was brought outside the limita-
tions period, her claim was properly dismissed.
III. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Though it has long been assumed to be the case, the Texas Supreme
Court in City of Midland v. O'Bryant 54 held that it would not impose "a
duty of good faith and fair dealing on employers in light of the variety of
statutes that the Legislature has already enacted to regulate employment
relationships. ' 155 The court noted that judicially imposed duties would
alter the at-will nature of employment in Texas and that no reason existed
to justify allowing a party "to make an end-run around the procedural
requirements and specific remedies the existing [discrimination and other
employment] statutes establish. ' 156 Despite the court's reaffirmation of
the at-will nature of employment in Texas, determining when parties
modify the at-will nature of employment continues to be a frequently liti-
gated issue.
Whether an offer and acceptance of employment for a stated salary
creates a definite term of employment is often the source of litigation.
Despite the presumption articulated in Montgomery County Hospital
District v. Brown157 against modification of at-will employment, offering
a per annum salary in a letter may be considered as evidence of an offer
of a definite term contract. In Ferrell v. Arbitron Co.,1 58 Ferrell received
a verbal offer of employment which was followed by a letter stating that
the company was pleased that he accepted the verbal offer "at a salary of
$40,000 per year."' 9 The letter also stated that it was the complete and
only agreement between Ferrell and Arbitron resulting in the court disre-
garding the disclaimer language contained in the employment applica-
tion. The court held that letter offering the annual salary was sufficient to
limit Ferrell's status as an at-will employee and reversed the summary
judgment the trial court had granted in Arbitron's favor.1 60
The majority of courts in similar cases during the survey period reached
153. Id. at 67.
154. 18 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. 2000).
155. Id. at 216.
156. Id.
157. 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998).
158. No. 05-97-01622-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8137 (Tex. App. - Dallas Nov. 1,
1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
159. Id. at *5.
160. Id. at *9.
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a different result. In Patitu v. Nationsbank of Texas,161 the employer of-
fered the applicant a job as "a full-time employee to go into a formalized
training program." The court held that this language alone, without an
unequivocal indication of the employer's intent to be bound by the prom-
ise to train the applicant, was not sufficient to create a contract with a
definite term. 162
In Smith v. SCI Management Corp.,163 Smith contended that a verbal
conversation concerning his annual salary created a contract of employ-
ment, taking him outside the employment at-will doctrine. The conversa-
tion occurred during an annual performance review when the supervisor
told Smith that his annual compensation for the following year would be
$85,000. There were no further discussions about the terms and condi-
tions of employment, and the supervisor did not make any promise to
employ Smith for a one-year period. Subsequent to the conversation,
SCI discovered that Smith's department had improperly shifted costs
among various construction projects and asked Smith to resign.
After his forced resignation, Smith sued for wrongful termination, con-
tending that he had a contract of employment and that his resignation
was obtained by duress. The court contrasted the facts of Smith's termi-
nation with the facts of Winograd v. Willis.164 In Winograd, the court
held that under the English rule, "a hiring based on an agreement of an
annual salary limits in a 'meaningful and special way' the employer's pre-
rogative to discharge the employee during the dictated period of employ-
ment. '165 The Smith court held that the English rule only applies when
there is evidence indicating that the parties intended to limit the em-
ployee's at-will status and that the general discussion concerning his sal-
ary was insufficient to modify the at-will nature of his employment.' 66
Then, in Paul Quinn College v. Marshall,167 the college offered Ms.
Marshall a position paying "$40,000 per annum." After she was termi-
nated Marshall alleged the college breached her employment contract
based on the annual salary offer. The court held that the offer letter did
not limit in a "meaningful and special way" the college's right to termi-
nate Marshall without cause. 168
Although Texas courts apply a presumption of at-will employment, an
employee and employer may nonetheless create contractual rights and
obligations concerning other terms and conditions of employment. One
of the leading cases is Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc.,169 which held that
161. 90 F. Supp. 2d 781 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
162. Id. at 794.
163. 29 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
164. Id. at 267 (citing Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
165. Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310.
166. Smith, 29 S.W.3d at 267-68.
167. No. 05-97-01939-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 369 (Tex. App. - Dallas Jan. 18, 2000,
pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
168. Id. at *6.
169. 711 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1986).
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employers have the right to change the terms and conditions of employ-
ment midstream during an employee's tenure by: (1) providing unequivo-
cal notice of the change; and (2) informing the employee that continued
employment constitutes acceptance of the policy. 170 In Werden v. Nueces
County Hospital District,171 the court applied General Mills and held that
an employee handbook giving the employer discretion to change sick
leave benefits did not create a protected interest in any accrued bene-
fits. 172 Because the employees continued to work with knowledge of the
changes to the employee benefit plan, the employees accepted the modi-
fied terms as a matter of law. 173
B. RELEASES/WAIVERS
In Ambrosio v. EPS Wireless, Inc.,174 the former CFO of EPS alleged
that the president and majority stockholder of EPS promised to grant 5%
of the stock to the CFO at the time of hiring. The CFO never received
the 5% stake in the company and sued the president of the corporation in
his individual capacity. Before the lawsuit was filed, the CFO and EPS
entered into a release and settlement agreement. In that release, the
president of the company was not identified by name. The court noted
that under Texas law "a party may only claim the protection of a release
if the release refers to him by name or with such descriptive particularity
that his identity or his connection with the event is not in doubt. ' 175 The
court held that since the president of the company was not identified in
his individual capacity in the release, he may not claim protection with
respect to any causes of action asserted against him in his individual
capacity. 176
C. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Many employment law practitioners predicted that the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce177 would make it more
difficult for employers to have intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims dismissed at the summary judgment stage. While courts still rou-
tinely dismiss IIED claims as a matter of law, whether conduct is suffi-
ciently "outrageous" to state an IIED claim has received heightened
judicial scrutiny.
The best example of this scrutiny in the Survey period came in Fields v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 988.178 Fields worked for the union as a sec-
170. See id. at 229.
171. 28 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
172. See id. at 651.
173. Id. at 652.
174. No. 05-99-01442-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5500 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 17,
2000, no pet.).
175. Id. at *8-9 (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984)).
176. Id. at *11.
177. 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999).
178. 23 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
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retary. She claimed that her supervisor, Terry Lovan, became obsessed
with her within weeks of her employment. Lovan made repeated ad-
vances to her and asked her to come to his apartment for "pizza, beer,
and a hot tub." She also claimed that Lovan forced her to dance with him
and sought to have Fields meet him along with another woman at his
apartment. After Fields did not show up, she claimed that Lovan began
to berate her about her personal phone calls, doctor visits and vacation
scheduling. She also alleged Lovan told her that her job security de-
pended on his recommendation. When Fields told Lovan that his com-
ments had offended her, Lovan apologized, although not sincerely. Fields
told Lovan that she hoped that he would not hold her comments against
her. Lovan allegedly answered, "the only thing I want to hold against you
is me."'179
After these and other incidents, Fields complained about Lovan's con-
duct to a union business agent. She next complained to members of the
union's legal department, who told her that they would investigate the
allegations. The union never contacted her again. Soon thereafter, a
union election was held and a new union president was elected. The new
president fired four people, one of whom was Ms. Fields.
In addition to her statutory claims of discrimination, duress, harass-
ment, and retaliation, Fields contended that the union and Lovan, indi-
vidually, engaged in intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court
noted that the union had cited a "plethora of cases holding that certain
conduct was not extreme and outrageous" and sought to have the court
dismiss the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a mat-
ter of law.180 The central issue was whether the conduct "rises to the
level that reasonable minds could disagree whether it was extreme and
outrageous.' 181 On the spectrum of "outrageous conduct," as analyzed in
various IIED cases, the court found that Fields' treatment fell "midway
among the cases."'1 82 One end of the spectrum there was a case of "an
employer with a gun in hand who threatens an employee," and on the
other end was "a case of an employer who simply uses foul language
around the water cooler."'1 83 The court found that Lovan's conduct could
be regarded by reasonable minds as beyond the scope of an ordinary em-
ployment dispute and held that a jury should decide her claims of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.184
In City of Midland v. O'Bryant,185 the court stepped back into its tradi-
tional mode of holding that routine employment decisions, as a matter of
law, do not create a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Specifically, the court held that an employer's decision to reclassify posi-
179. Id. at 522.
180. Id. at 531.
181. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46 cmt. h.
182. Fields, 23 S.W.3d at 531.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 533.
185. 18 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. 2000).
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tions formerly held by police officers to civilian positions did not, stand-
ing alone, constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.
186
A number of other courts dismissed IIED claims as a matter of law. In
Haley v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, Inc.,187 Haley worked for Blue
Cross from 1982 until June of 1995. She filed a charge of discrimination
contending that her supervisor constantly yelled at her, was demeaning to
her in front of coworkers, and once threw tapes and files at her desk. In
addition, another supervisor and other coworkers made statements and
jokes that she considered racist. The court dismissed her claims of dis-
crimination because she had not filed her claim within 180 days as re-
quired by the Texas Labor Code.188 The court also dismissed her claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. After recognizing some simi-
larity to the facts of GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, the court held that the
racial slurs and jokes, even if true, did not rise to the level necessary to
support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.1 89
Even if a terminated employee establishes a prima facie case of defa-
mation to survive summary judgment, it does not follow that such con-
duct also states an IIED claim. In DeWald v. Home Depot, Inc.,190 Home
Depot fired DeWald for allegedly stealing approximately six dollars
worth of fire wood (even though his supervisor had given him permission
to pay a discount for the product) and then depicted DeWald as a thief to
his co-workers. It held that "[f]alsely depicting a former employee in the
community as a thief is not sufficiently outrageous to raise a fact issue for
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 191
In Smith v. Maguire, Inc.,1 92 Smith alleged age and sex discrimination
in addition to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Smith testified
that for the first two months of her employment, her supervisor acted
appropriately. After that, however, she alleged that he was abusive,
screamed at her, cursed at her, and slammed doors. She also claimed that
when she was fired, her supervisor directed her to: "Get in here and sit
your ass down and close the door. You're out of here. Nobody likes you.
Nobody likes you up here. And you've got 30 days to leave."'1 93 She also
testified that her supervisor made comments like "[w]omen are stupid,
especially older women.' 94 The court held that the supervisor's behav-
ior was "rude and his language crass," but it was nothing more than "in-
186. Id. at 217.
187. No. 05-98-00489-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3895 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jun. 14,
2000, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication).
188. Id. at *3; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.202 (Vernon 1996).
189. Haley, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3895 at *9.
190. No. 05-98-00013-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5757 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 25,
2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication). For an additional discussion of the facts of
the case, see infra notes 206-11.
191. Id. at *33.
192. No. 05-99-00002-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9355 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 17,
1999, no pet.).
193. Id. at *8.
194. Id. at *9.
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sults and boorish behavior" which did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous.195
In another Wal-Mart decision, the court of appeals reversed a decision
in favor of Russell Bertrand in a constructive discharge and intentional
infliction of emotional distress case.1 96 After a jury trial, the court
awarded Bertrand over $1 million dollars against Wal-Mart. After hold-
ing that Bertrand could point to no evidence in the record to support his
claim that he was constructively discharged because of his age, the court
then turned to the evidence in support of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. 197 Bertrand cited only the Bruce decision in
support of his position that there was legally sufficient evidence to sup-
port the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 198 The court
contrasted in detail the actual findings made in the Bruce decision to the
facts in the trial record.199 The court noted that the Bruce plaintiffs were
subjected to outrageous behavior for more than two-and-a-half years for
the entire workday. Bertrand only worked for the alleged harasser for
five months, and their shifts did not overlap except for a few hours each
day. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's decision to enter
judgment on Bertrand's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.200
In Foye v. Montes,201 Montes sued Foye and his employer claiming that
Foye made sexual advances toward her and also sexually harassed her
while she was employed. The trial court entered judgment against Foye
in the amount of $30,000. The issue on appeal was whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the court's finding of intentional infliction
of emotional distress and assault against Foye.20 2 Montes testified that
Foye asked her intimate questions about her clothing. She also con-
tended that Foye made advances to her, that his calls to her home upset
her husband, and that Foye's recommendation to watch the movie Like
Water for Chocolate (because it depicted sex and nudity) caused her se-
vere emotional distress. She also claimed that Foye left her notes saying
that she drove him "crazy" and that she had a "heart-shaped ass."
A few months later, Foye invited Montes to attend a client's Christmas
party. She felt uncomfortable because the other guests were there with
their spouses. At the party, she alleged that Foye, while sitting next to
her, touched her thigh and asked her "would you like to go have a drink
or something." He also told her "a lot can be done in an hour and a
half."20 3
195. Id. at *12.
196. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bertrand, No. 12-99-00156-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS
3658 (Tex. App.-Tyler May 31, 2000, pet. denied, rehearing requested).
197. Id. at *27.
198. Id. at *28-*29.
199. Id. at *29-*34.
200. Id. at *34.
201. 9 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
202. Id. at 438.
203. Id. at 439.
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In a bench trial, the court found that Foye had engaged in intentional
infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery. On appeal, the
court held that Foye's conduct did not rise to the level of being outra-
geous and extreme; therefore, it held that the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim failed as a matter of law.2 04 However, the court
held that Foye's touching was legally sufficient to support the finding of
assault and battery.20 5
D. DEFAMATION
Responding to concerns of theft by employees is a double-edged sword
for employers. On the one hand, employers want their workers to appre-
ciate the fact that theft makes the business less profitable and that theft
incidents will be investigated thoroughly. On the other hand, accusing an
employee of theft exposes the employer to claims of defamation. Often,
the value of the product allegedly stolen is hardly worth the heartache
and expense of litigation.
In DeWald v. Home Depot,20 6 DeWald, while on duty as an employee
of Home Depot, asked the assistant manager if he could buy some un-
bundled firewood. The assistant manager told Dewald he could buy two
cartloads of the unbundled firewood for the price of three bundles of
firewood. He then took the two shopping carts to the checkout counter
and paid $6.14 for the firewood. Home Depot's loss prevention and se-
curity manager, Sam Money, saw DeWald loading the firewood into his
truck. Money then questioned both the assistant manager and DeWald
about the transaction. Money told DeWald to either unload the firewood
or pay for any excess wood over three bundles. DeWald did neither. Af-
ter additional questioning by Money, DeWald was terminated. About a
month after he was fired, Money and Ty Levins, another manager, told
the employees at Home Depot that DeWald was fired for theft. In a
storewide meeting, DeWald's coworkers were told that "DeWald had
been terminated for stealing firewood and had to be dealt with in the
same fashion as Home Depot dealt with other shoplifters." 20 7
Home Depot sought to have DeWald's defamation claim dismissed as a
matter of law by contending that the comments made were "substantially
true. °208 The court analyzed "whether, in the mind of the average reader
or listener, the defamatory statements were more damaging to DeWald's
reputation than truthful statements would have been. °20 9 The court held,
under this standard, that Home Depot failed to show that the defamatory
accusations were substantially true.210
204. Id. at 440.
205. Id. at 441.
206. No. 05-98-00013-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5757 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 25,
2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
207. Id. at *8.
208. Id. at *13.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *14.
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Home Depot next sought the protection of the qualified privilege. The
court noted that the privilege often extends to individual managers or
supervisors communicating with employees about a coworker's malfea-
sance, but not here. The court held that "the statements were made to
make an example of DeWald and intimidate other employees, which are
not legitimate goals or purposes that would form the basis for privi-
lege."'211 As a result, the court remanded the case for trial.
The court also rekindled the doctrine of self-publication in stating:
[I]n the real world of employment, employers should expect termi-
nated employees to share with prospective employers the alleged
reasons for their termination. If an employer gives untrue defama-
tory reasons for terminating an employee, it should recognize that
such conduct creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory mat-
ter will be communicated to prospective employers.212
Another rock and a hard place for employers can be terminating an
employee accused of sexual harassment. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Lane,213 Lane recovered a multi-million dollar jury-verdict award against
Wal-Mart on a defamation claim. While employed with Wal-Mart, Lane
complained that a female coworker was spreading rumors that Lane had
sexually harassed her. After investigating Lane's complaint, Wal-Mart
concluded that Lane had sexually harassed the female employee and ter-
minated Lane for that reason. In reversing the jury finding of defama-
tion, the appellate court held that the comments made about Lane fell
into three categories: (1) statements made during the company's investi-
gation; (2) statements made in relation to Lane's claim for unemployment
benefits; and (3) general rumors concerning the reason for his termina-
tion.214 The court held that there was no evidence of malice sufficient to
support a finding that Wal-Mart lost its qualified privilege from state-
ments made in its investigation.21 5 The court also held that the state-
ments made in the quasi-judicial proceedings were absolutely
privileged. 216 Then, as to the third category, the court held that there was
no evidence that the source of the rumors concerning Lane were made by
an agent or vice principal of Wal-Mart. 217
Wal-Mart achieved a similar result in Muniz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.218
One day at work, employees began to circulate a photograph of a nude
man that was taken from a packet of photographs that had been devel-
oped for a customer. Muniz complained to her supervisor, who, accord-
ing to Muniz, laughed about the incident. Muniz then reported the
missing photograph through Wal-Mart's loss prevention hot-line. After
211. Id. at *18.
212. DeWald, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5757 at *27-*28.
213. 31 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. review filed).
214. Id. at 290.
215. Id. at 293.
216. Id. at 290.
217. Id. at 290-91.
218. No. 13-98-650-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2186 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Mar.
31, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
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that complaint, several employees were questioned about the photo-
graph. Wal-Mart terminated two of Muniz's coworkers for distributing
the photograph. Muniz complained that others were involved in the inci-
dent and that her supervisors were threatening her for reporting the mat-
ter. Wal-Mart continued to investigate the incident and obtained
additional written statements. In that process, Muniz was implicated as
being the person who had promoted the viewing of the photo. Muniz
contended that these written statements, as well as other oral statements
made during Wal-Mart's investigation, were false and defamatory.
The court held that Wal-Mart had a conditional or qualified privilege
that attached to "communications made in the course of an investigation
following a report of employee wrongdoing. '2 19 Because of the extended
nature of the investigation, the court distinguished between those individ-
uals who had a "duty" to investigate and those with an "interest" in the
investigation. The court found that all of the Wal-Mart employees mak-
ing or hearing the statements either had a "duty" to investigate or had an
"interest" in participating in the investigation.220
Next, the court considered whether there was evidence of actual malice
sufficient to defeat the qualified privilege. Muniz pointed to the fact that
the individuals who made statements implicating her were close friends
with the store manager, who, according to Muniz, was retaliating against
her for reporting the incident. Muniz argued that Wal-Mart should have
doubted the veracity of the statements due to the connection between the
individuals and the store manager. The court held that because there was
no evidence that the investigator was aware or had knowledge of the per-
sonal relationship between those making the statements and the store
manager, there was no evidence of actual malice.2 21
In TRT Development Co. - KC v. Meyers,222 Valero Energy Company
held a family day picnic and golf tournament at the Kings Crossing Golf
& Country Club. At the end of the day, Meyers, an intoxicated Valero
employee, was inside the country club's pro shop. As he was leaving, the
manager of the pro shop noticed that Meyers had bulges in his pockets.
The manager walked over to the area where Meyers had been standing
near a shirt rack and noticed that several empty shirt hangers were left on
top of the rack. The manager then followed Meyers to his truck. When
the manager attempted to question Meyers about the bulges in his
pocket, Meyers drove off quickly without answering any questions. The
country club then contacted Valero's manager of human relations and
public affairs. As a result of that communication, Valero initiated an in-
vestigation but could not establish that Meyers had indeed stolen the
shirts, as Meyers claimed that he had beer kuzies stuffed in his pockets
when he was leaving. During the investigation, Valero did learn that
219. Id. at *6.
220. Id. at *8.
221. Id. at *10-*11.
222. 15 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
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Meyers was intoxicated and was "loud and rowdy" during the tourna-
ment. As a result of the investigation, Valero suspended Meyers for ten
days without pay. Later, Valero fired Meyers because he had filed a law-
suit against Valero and because he had recorded telephone conversations
with other Valero employees.
In the lawsuit against the country club and its employees for defama-
tion, the court held that the communications from the country club's em-
ployees to Valero were protected by the qualified privilege. 223 The court
noted that "[a]n interest giving rise to a qualified privilege may be that of
the publisher of the communication, the recipient of the communication,
or a third person. '224 Because Valero had an interest in knowing that its
employee may have been involved in a theft while participating in a com-
pany-sponsored event, the country club's statements to Valero concerned
a "subject in which they had a common interest" and were protected by
the qualified privilege.225
The angst, heartache, and animosity mixed with unsubstantiated allega-
tions of theft is a dangerous combination. This was made evident in S& T
Aircraft Accessories, Inc. v. Bonnington.226 Bonnington's lifelong friend,
Orville Turner, offered Bonnington a job to take charge of S&T's back-
shop. Bonnington moved from Arizona to New Braunfels, Texas, and
accepted the job offer. When he made the move, he moved in with
Orville and his wife, Mary, who was also employed in the business.
Orville's health deteriorated to the point that he required heart surgery.
At that time, Mary asked Bonnington to move out of the house because
relatives were coming to stay while Orville recuperated. As he was pack-
ing, Bonnington took one of the Turner's ashtrays and wrapped it in his
dirty laundry, intending to take it to his apartment. Mary later found the
ashtray and accused Bonnington of being a thief. Bonnington responded
that he was not trying to steal it and that he was going to ask her before
taking it. At trial, Turner testified, "'I know what he did and he is a liar
and he is a thief"' and that she would take that conviction "to her
grave. '227 After the ashtray incident, Mary could not refrain from shar-
ing her thoughts with other S&T employees, the S&T Board of Directors,
and other individuals outside of the company. She also made comments
that she believed Bonnington was stealing inventory and had stolen other
silverware and glasses from their home.
At trial, the jury found that S&T and Mary Turner defamed Bon-
nington. On appeal, the defendants first alleged that the statements
made about Bonnington were opinions rather than factual assertions.
The court held that "[s]imply saying 'I think' or 'in my opinion' before
labeling someone a thief does not dispel the harmful implication that the
223. Id. at 286-87.
224. Id. at 286.
225. Id. at 287.
226. No. 03-98-00648, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 73 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 6, 2000, pet.
dism'd w.o.j.) (not designated for publication).
227. Id. at *10.
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speaker knows for a fact that the accused has stolen. '228
The court then rejected the contention that Turner's statements were
protected by a qualified privilege. 229 Even though the privilege applies to
communications between employers and employees, the court found that
Turner's statements went beyond matters in which any S&T employees
may have had an interest. 230 The lesson? Do not let guests smoke in
your house.
In Kooken v. The Leather Center, Inc.,231 the Leather Center hired
Randy Kooken as its transportation manager. In this capacity, Kooken
was required to use a third-party transportation services contractor to de-
liver the Leather Center's products to its customers. Kooken selected to
use a contractor with whom he had been employed just prior to accepting
the position with The Leather Center.
When Kooken's supervisor learned that he was using a new transporta-
tion contractor, he became concerned that Kooken was receiving kick-
backs or commissions from the carrier due to his previous employment
relationship with the company. The Leather Center's purchasing director
called the transportation company and implied that he was aware that
Kooken was receiving commissions and accused the company of engaging
in improper business tactics. About a week after that conversation,
Kooken was fired.
The court held that the statements made about Kooken to his previous
employer established a prima facie case of slander per se.232 The court
found that the purchasing director's use of the word "commission" im-
plied "a kickback. '233 Further, the court found that there was evidence
that the purchasing director's tone of voice and attitude was accusatory
because he charged the carrier with the use of improper business tac-
tics. 234 Based on the context of the statements, there was a fact question
as to the meaning of the statements. The court also held that the Leather
Center's communications were not protected by the qualified privilege.235
The court noted that the purchasing director's comments went outside
the boundary of those having a corresponding interest in the
disclosure. 236
E. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
In Crow v. Rockett Special Utility District,237 the court analyzed
whether an at-will employee may assert a claim for fraud against an em-
228. Id. at *18.
229. Id. at *21.
230. Id. at *20.
231. No. 05-97-01202-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2161 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 3, 2000,
no pet.) (not designated for publication).
232. Id. at *11.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *9.
235. Id. at *14.
236. Id.
237. 17 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).
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ployer for reneging on a promise to follow a system of progressive disci-
pline. Crow complained that the employer committed fraud by issuing a
policy of progressive discipline. The employer raised as an affirmative
defense to the fraud claim that Crow was an at-will employee. The court
held that "[i]f an at-will employee such as Crow were allowed to assert
that his employer's policies constitute fraudulent representations, then
the at-will employment doctrine would be effectively eviscerated." 238
F. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
An issue that continues to be monitored by employers and temporary
agencies involves the joint or coemployer doctrine. In Morrison v. Pin-
kerton, Inc.,239 a security guard was assigned to work at a certain facility.
Because the security guard sued both the security agency and the owner
of the facility for disability discrimination, the court held the two entities
were joint employers of the security guard. As a result, the security
guard's tortious interference claim failed as a matter of law because a
joint employer cannot tortiously interfere with the other employer.240
A tortious interference claim may provide an employer with leverage
to prevent the raiding of its employees, even when a covenant not to
compete may be unenforceable. In Software Systems, Inc. v. Ajuria,241
Software Systems, Inc. ("SSI") hired four Mexican nationals to install
computer software for its clients. One of SSI's clients was International
Paper ("IP"). SSI assogned the four employees to IP's headquarters in
Memphis, Tennessee, pursuant to a contract between IP and SSI. One of
SSI's competitors, Resource Support Associates, Inc. ("RSA") hired the
four employees to work for it in Denver, Colorado. After learning of
their decision to work for a competitor, SSI sued its former employees
and RSA. SSI asserted several claims of tortious interference against
RSA. After finding that the covenants not to compete were unenforce-
able, the court also dismissed any allegations of tortious interference by
RSA to induce employees to breach their noncompetition agreements.242
The employees all testified that they were unhappy with RSA and that
their reason for leaving SSI's employment was not because of interfer-
ence by RSA.243
On the other hand, the court looked upon SSI's relationship with IP in
a different light. SSI presented summary judgment evidence that IP, as a
result of SSI's inability to maintain a steady stable of programmers,
changed its business relationship with SSI. The court held that there was
evidence that RSA's conduct caused the change and, therefore, the issue
of tortious interference with prospective business relationship should go
238. Id. at 329-30.
239. 7 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
240. Id. at 859.
241. No. 05-99-01338-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5277 (Tex. App. - Dallas Aug. 9,
2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
242. Id. at *14.





Attempts to create and impose new judicially imposed duties on em-
ployers did not meet with much success in the Survey period.
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lane,245 Lane sought to hold Wal-Mart lia-
ble under a claim of "negligent investigation." He urged the court to cre-
ate an implied duty to exercise reasonable care when conducting a sexual
harassment investigation. The court recognized that such a theory would
abrogate the traditional at-will employment contract and that under ex-
isting precedent, no such claim existed.246
Does an employer, who has been victimized by theft by one of its em-
ployees, have a duty to report and prosecute a crime against the em-
ployee, who subsequently victimizes another business? That was the
issue in the San Benito Bank & Trust Co. v. Landair Travels.247 Debby
Pena, an employee of CPA Carlos Cascos, embezzled $78,000 from an
account belonging to Landair. When Landair discovered the embezzle-
ment, it reported the theft to Pena's employer, CPA Cascos. Cascos con-
fronted Pena who admitted embezzling the money. Rather than
reporting the embezzlement to the police, Cascos worked out an agree-
ment between Landair and Pena whereby Landair would get its money
back and Pena would not go to jail.
Less than a week after her embezzlement from Landair, Pena applied
for a job as a bookkeeper with the law firm of Johnson & Davis. Pena
told Johnson & Davis nothing about her recent legal problems. Pena
soon forged a check on the law firm's trust account which she converted
into a $75,000 cashier's check payable to Landair. The law firm and the
bank that issued the cashier's check sued Pena's employer for failing to
report Pena's embezzlement of the Landair funds.
The bank and the law firm contended that the employer breached his
duty to report the embezzlement and such breach proximately caused
them to lose the money that Pena embezzled from them. The court re-
cited the general rule that "a person has no legal duty to protect another
from the criminal acts of a third person. ''248 After analyzing premises
liability cases, the court found that it was not foreseeable that Pena would
commit another crime. 249 Further, the court noted that the former em-
ployer did not exercise any "control" over Pena once she left her employ-
ment to trigger a duty under the premises liability line of cases.250
244. Id. at *21.
245. 31 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. filed). See also a discussion
of this case supra notes 213-217 in the Defamation section.
246. Id. at 293-94.
247. 31 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
248. Id. at 317.
249. Id. at 318.
250. Id. at 319.
1342 [Vol. 54
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
The court also analyzed whether a new common law duty should be
created. The factors generally analyzed in determining whether to im-
pose a duty are:
(1) social, economic, and political questions and their application to
the facts at hand; (2) the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury
weighed against the social utility of the actors' conduct, the magni-
tude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the conse-
quences of placing the burden on the defendant; and (3) whether one
party would generally have superior knowledge of the risk or right to
control the actor who caused the harm. 251
The court determined that "[a] private citizen should be free to handle
the experience of being victimized by a criminal without incurring tort
liability to any future victims of that criminal. ' 252
The court further rejected the bank and law firm's cause of action for
negligence per se. The plaintiffs contended that the employer had knowl-
edge of the commission of a felony and then concealed or failed to report
it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 and TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.05. The
court held that the negligence per se doctrine should not apply because
the issues of reporting criminal conduct should be left to "the criminal
justice system rather than in the hands of private individuals .... ",253
Does an employer owe a duty to a police officer injured while respond-
ing to a domestic dispute involving an off-duty employee? As discussed
in Ianni v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc.,254 generally, the answer is
no. In Ianni, however, the employer had enabled one of its employees,
Tingle, to stay on a crystal-methamphetamine high that ultimately led to
Tingle shooting lanni, a police officer, who was responding to a call that
Tingle was abusing his wife. In a high-stress work environment in which a
crew of twelve travelled around the country repairing and refurbishing
railroad tracks, Tingle began using crystal meth to stay alert. His supervi-
sor not only was aware of the drug use, but also used the drug himself.
As the court noted, the deposition testimony taken in the case "paints a
frightening picture of the crew's life on the rails. ' 255
The initial focus of the court was on the issue of the employer's duty.
The court noted: [W]hen, because of an employee's incapacity, an
employer exercises control over the employee, the employer has a
duty to take such action as a reasonably prudent employer under the
same or similar circumstances would take to prevent the employee
from causing an unreasonable risk of harm to others.256
The court first looked to see whether the employer had taken any af-
firmative acts of control over the employee. In addition to the fact that
251. Id. at 321.
252. Id.
253. San Benito, 31 S.W.3d at 322.
254. 16 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.)
255. Id. at 514.
256. Id. at 514, (quoting Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. 1983)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965)).
2001] 1343
SMU LAW REVIEW
75% of the crew, including the foremen, were using drugs to meet gruel-
ing working conditions and that the supervisors gave time off to a crew
member to buy drugs to bring back to others on the crew, the critical
evidence related to testimony that the employer was warned that the em-
ployee was becoming violent and was on the verge of spinning out of
control and did nothing about it. Thus, a fact issue existed concerning
whether the employer exercised control over the employee. 257
Next, the court analyzed whether any act or omission proximately
caused the injury to the police officer.258 The employer sought to limit
the zone of danger to include only these individuals who might be injured
in a work-related event. The court held that because the employer did
not remove the employee from the job and require drug testing, the jury
should determine whether the employer's acts caused the police officer's
injuries. 259
In Estrada v. Allen,260 Estrada worked for a staff leasing company.
Following an injury, he brought a lawsuit against the company that had
entered into a leasing agreement with Estrada's employer. Estrada later
amended his petition to assert a claim against the leasing company for
breach of contract. He contended that the leasing agreement included an
agreement that the owner would provide Estrada with a safe place to
work. The leasing company persuaded the court that such a claim had to
fail because: (1) the claim had been filed more than two years after the
accident; and (2) that the duty to maintain a safe workplace sounds in
tort, rather than contract. 261
In Sparks v. Butler Mfg. Co., 2 6 2 David Kennedy died in an industrial
accident when a forklift he was operating overturned. Mr. Kennedy's son
then brought suit against Butler Manufacturing and contended that But-
ler's gross negligence caused the death of his father. To recover on a
claim for gross negligence, a plaintiff must establish "(1) that the defen-
dant's action involved an extreme degree of risk, and (2) the defendant
was subjectively aware that its actions involved an extreme degree of risk
and nevertheless proceeded in conscious indifference to the rights, safety,
or welfare of others. '263 The only evidence offered to the court by the
plaintiff in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment
was an affidavit by a specially retained expert. The court held that the
expert's affidavit contained only legal conclusions and did not provide
any evidence to establish that Butler was aware that its actions involved
an extreme degree of risk. As a result, the court upheld the trial court's
257. Id. at 523.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 523-24.
260. No. 13-98-297-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9069 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec.
2, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
261. Id. at *10.
262. No. 05-99-00115-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8731 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 22,
1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
263. Id. at *4-*5.
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decision to grant summary judgment. 264
In Geedman v. Rush Transport, Inc. ,265 Mr. and Mrs. Geedman were
broadsided by a truck driven by a Rush Transport driver who was on his
way to deliver packages to the airport. The Geedmans sued for negli-
gence and gross negligence, respondeat superior, negligent hiring, and
negligent hiring of a contractor. At trial, the jury found that Geedman
and the driver were each 50% at fault and awarded no damages. The jury
also found that the driver was an independent contractor, not an em-
ployee, of Rush Transport.
On appeal, the Geedmans challenged the factual sufficiency of the
jury's finding that the driver was an independent contractor. The court
reviewed several factors in analyzing who controlled the progress and de-
tails of the work.266 Those factors were: nature of the business; tools,
supplies, and material furnished; control of the job's progress, except the
final result; length of employment; and paid by time or the job.267 After a
review of these factors and the record developed at trial, the court held
that the jury's finding was "not so contrary to the great weight and pre-
ponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. '268
The court also analyzed whether Rush had a duty in retaining the
driver. At trial, there was evidence that the driver had a previous convic-
tion for driving while intoxicated. The Geedmans contended that Rush
had a duty to thoroughly investigate the driver's driving history and hab-
its, beyond checking his official record and that the breach of this duty
proximately caused their injuries. The court noted that "[a] person who
employs an independent contractor has a duty to use ordinary care in
selecting the contractor when the work to be performed involves a risk of
physical harm if not skillfully performed. '269 The court then focused on
the proximate cause analysis. It noted that an employer cannot be liable
for negligent hiring unless the same condition that made the hiring negli-
gent also caused the injury.270 After noting that the issue of proximate
cause is a matter of law for a court to determine, 271 the court held that
had Rush inspected the official driving record, it would have discovered
only a single conviction for DWI four years earlier. This information was
not sufficient to establish that Rush would foresee that the driver would
be involved two years later in a traffic accident in which alcohol was not a
factor. Thus, the court of appeals held that the trial court's directed ver-
dict was proper.272
264. Id. at *6-*7.
265. No. 01-98-01102-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Jun. 1, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
266. Id. at *4-*7.
267. Id.
268. Id. at *6-*7.
269. Id. at *7.
270. Id. at *8.
271. Geedman, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 at *8 (citing Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater
Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477-78 (Tex. 1995)).
272. Id. at *9.
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In Garcia v. Allen,2 73 Garcia worked for Hoechst Celanese Corpora-
tion. When he was hired, he had already had his kneecap removed as a
result of a previous job-related injury. While employed with Hoechst Ce-
lanese, he had another knee surgery resulting in permanent restrictions
that prohibited him from climbing, squatting, kneeling and crawling. Be-
cause of these permanent restrictions, which prevented him from per-
forming the essential functions of his job, he was terminated.
Garcia alleged that he was terminated for another reason: as "part of a
vendetta propagated against him by his two supervisors. ' 27 4 After his
termination, in addition to claims of disability discrimination, he brought
two theories of negligence against his employer. He first contended that
his employer had a duty to investigate the reasons his supervisors were
recommending his termination. The court dismissed this claim, stating
that it would violate the Texas Supreme Court's holding in City of Mid-
land v. O'Bryant, prohibiting a court from imposing a duty that would
abrogate the at-will nature of employment in Texas.275
Garcia's second theory was that the employer negligently hired, super-
vised and retained the two supervisors that recommended his termina-
tion. Garcia alleged that the employer's negligence in failing to exercise
reasonable care in supervising Garcia's supervisors resulted in his being
injured. The court viewed Garcia's theory as the equivalent of forcing a
square peg in a round hole: it just did not fit. First, the court held that the
negligent supervision claim would have to result in physical harm to the
plaintiff.27 6 Since Garcia had not alleged any physical injury, his negli-
gence theory was not viable. The court also stated that an employer can-
not be held liable for the negligent act of an employee unless the
employee committed an actionable tort.277 The court held that, since
there is no duty to investigate an employee's ability to perform his job
before making a termination decision, a derivative negligence claim must
also fail.278
In Ortiz v. Furr's Supermarkets,27 9 Ortiz worked for S&M Cleaning,
(S&M) cleaning floors for S&M's clients, in this case Furr's Supermar-
kets. One night two of Furr's employees assaulted Ortiz, and Ortiz sued
Furr's and S&M alleging several negligence-based causes of action.
Before trial, Ortiz non-suited S&M and ultimately alleged that he was a
borrowed employee of Furr's. Because Furr's had opted out of the work-
ers' compensation system, Ortiz's remedy was not limited to workers
compensation benefits. At trial, the jury found that Ortiz was a Furr's
borrowed employee and also found that S&M was 50% responsible for
his injuries.
273. 28 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).
274. Id. at 590.
275. Id. at 591-92.
276. Id. at 592-93.
277. Id. at 593.
278. Id.
279. 26 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet. h.).
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If there was evidence to support the borrowed employee finding,
Furr's, as an opt-out employer, stood to lose the benefit of the jury's pro-
portionate responsibility determination. On appeal, the court found no
evidence to support the jury's borrowed employee finding.280 S&M pro-
vided the equipment and tools for Ortiz to use and supervised his work.
Consequently, the court held that Ortiz was not an employee of Furr's
and any damages should be reduced by the negligence of S&M.28 l
H. SABINE PILOT CLAIMS
In Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck,282 the court created a narrow,
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. The Sabine Pilot exception
applies only if the plaintiff is forced to choose between refusing to com-
mit a criminal act and being discharged. The plaintiff must prove that the
discharge was for no other reason than the refusal to perform an illegal
act.
In Ellsworth Motor Freight Lines v. McWilliams,283 McWilliams alleged
that he was fired because he refused to dump cement dust at an unap-
proved dumpsite. The court noted that it is a violation of the Texas
Health & Safety Code for a person to transport solid waste to a place that
is not an approved site for disposal.284 McWilliams, however, offered no
evidence that the waste site was in fact unapproved. As a result, there
was no evidence for the court to determine whether the site where he was
asked to dump the cement dust was illegal. 285
In Williams v. Enserch Corp.,286 Williams began his career with En-
serch in 1984 as an environmental engineer. Over the next several years,
he was promoted to the position of Director of Environmental Services.
After a nine-year career, Williams alleged that Enserch fired him for
reporting its failure to comply with various environmental statutes and
regulations. According to Williams, when he brought his concerns to
others in Ensearch management, he was told to refrain from reporting
the violations. He claims that Enserch fired him once it learned that he
had filed anonymous complaints with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA"). Enserch alleged that it fired Williams for
harassing a coworker.
To support his Sabine Pilot claim, the court looked to see if Williams
could establish that Enserch ordered him to refrain from reporting envi-
ronmental concerns and that the failure to report would have subjected
him to criminal liability. Williams was unable to point to any statute that
280. Id. at 652.
281. Id. at 656.
282. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
283. No. 05-98-00874, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5611 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 22, 2000,
no pet.) (not designated for publication).
284. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 365.012(c).
285. Ellsworth, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5611 at *13.
286. No. 05-97-02071-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 371 (Tex. App. - Dallas Jan. 18, 2000,
pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
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would require him to report to OSHA and subject him to criminal pen-
alty for failing to make the report.2 87 As a result, the court upheld sum-
mary judgment in favor of Ensearch on the Sabine Pilot claim.
IV. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
There have been several noteworthy court decisions during the Survey
period concerning agreements aimed at restricting competition and the
disclosure of confidential or proprietary information, particularly involv-
ing businesses dealing with computer software and other information
technology. One such case, which involved an application for preliminary
injunction, was Learn2.Com, Inc. v. Bell.288
Learn2 develops and licenses computer-animation software. One of its
high-level employees, Bell, who had received significant exposure to the
company's software technology, executed an employment agreement con-
taining noncompete and nondisclosure clauses. Subsequently, Bell and
another employee of Learn2 decided to form a competing side business
named Media Sync. While employed full time at Learn2, Bell developed
computer-animation software for Media Sync and solicited business from
Learn2's customers. After Learn2 discovered Bell's involvement with
Media Sync, it sought a temporary restraining order in federal district
court. The court, in ordering the seizure of Media Sync's computers and
computer files, determined that Learn2 had demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits with regard to its claims, including those for breach
of the nondisclosure and noncompetition agreements. It found there was
a substantial threat of irreparable injury to Learn2, which outweighed any
threatened injury to Bell if the injunction were granted, and that an in-
junction would serve the public interest.289
In Software Systems, Inc. v. Ajuria,290 the individual defendants,
Ajuria, Garcia, and Vidal, worked as computer programmers for a com-
pany named Software Systems, Inc. (SSI). They each executed an em-
ployment agreement with SSI, which included a noncompetition
provision, and later quit to work for Research Support Associates, Inc.
("RSA"), a company that provided similar services. SSI sued the individ-
ual defendants for breach of their noncompete agreements and RSA for
tortious interference with contractual and prospective relations. RSA re-
sponded by attacking the noncompete agreements as having overly broad
geographic restrictions. Specifically, those agreements purported to re-
strict the defendants from performing certain specialized computer pro-
gramming anywhere in the United States for a period of one year. The
court, in granting RSA's motion for summary judgment on this issue, ob-
287. See id. at *9.
288. No. 3:00-CV-812-R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14283 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 20, 2000, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
289. See id. at *27-*52.
290. No. 05-99-01338-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5277 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 9,
2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
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served that a reasonable geographic limitation is typically considered to
be the territory in which the employee had worked.291 Here, the geo-
graphic restrictions were unenforceable because SSI and RSA worked in
mutually exclusive geographic locations, and the individual defendants
were not performing services for any of SSI's customers.2 92
Several courts also analyzed whether the sufficiency of consideration
necessary to support noncompetition agreements. The San Antonio
Court of Appeals, in Terminix International Co. v. Denton,293 found that
the agreement at issue did not meet the threshold requirement that it be
ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement. This was true because,
in exchange for the employee's valid promises, the employer's promise
that it merely "expected" to provide the employee with access to propri-
ety information was illusory.294 Houston's Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals, however, held that a noncompetition agreement was enforcea-
ble where it was supported by the employer's promise to actually provide
the employee with proprietary and confidential information.295
In two other unpublished decisions, the Dallas Court of Appeals found
that noncompetition agreements failed for lack of valid consideration. In
the first case, Ad Corn, Inc. v. Helms,296 the court found the employer's
promise that the employee would receive confidential information to be
illusory where performance of that promise depended on plaintiff's con-
tinued employment, which was within the employer's exclusive control. 297
The noncompetition agreement at issue in the other case, Security
Telecom Corp. v. Meziere,298 likewise failed for two reasons. First, the
only consideration given for the agreement was a separate, earlier mar-
keting agreement to which the employee was not a party.299 Moreover,
the nondisclosure section of the agreement did not constitute valid con-
sideration as there was no reciprocal promise by the employer to share
proprietary and confidential information with the plaintiff, and the past
disclosure of such information to the plaintiff could not be used to sup-
port the agreement. 300
291. Id. at *9.
292. Id. at *11-*13. Software Systems is also discussed at notes 229-231, infra.
293. No. 04-99-00563-CV, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 553 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Jan. 26,
2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
294. Id. at *8-*9.
295. Curtis v. Ziff Energy Group, Ltd., 12 S.W.3d 114, 118 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
296. No. 05-96-01706-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 484 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 21, 2000,
pet. dism'd) (not designated for publication).
297. Id. at *8-*11.
298. No. 05-98-00059-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 1818 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 22,
2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
299. Id. at *8.




A recent, significant case concerning the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement in the employment discrimination context is Jones v. Fujitsu
Network Communications, Inc. 30 1 In Fujitsu, the plaintiff was an at-will
employee who had entered into an arbitration agreement with his em-
ployer several years into his employment. The arbitration agreement
purported to cover any employment-related dispute arising between the
parties. The plaintiff later sued his employer in federal court for wrongful
termination under the Family Medical Leave Act,302 and the employer
moved to dismiss the suit and to compel arbitration.
In granting the employer's motion to dismiss and ordering that the dis-
pute be submitted to arbitration, the court first determined that the arbi-
tration agreement was a valid modification of plaintiff's terms and
conditions of employment, as the undisputed evidence showed that plain-
tiff had notice of the policy and its terms and he nevertheless continued
to work for his employer after it implemented the policy.30 3 Next, the
court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable because
it provided an adequate forum for plaintiff to resolve his statutory dis-
crimination claims. 30 4 However, the court determined that a provision of
the policy that required plaintiff to pay one-half of the arbitrator's fee
was an impermissible hurdle to plaintiff's pursuit of his claim through
arbitration, and thus struck that requirement from the policy.30 5 In Cline
v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co.,306 however, a different federal court in Texas
determined that such a fee-splitting provision in an arbitration agreement
was not unconscionable, and compelled the plaintiff to submit his em-
ployment-related claims to arbitration.30 7
Another important issue in the area of arbitration agreements is the
circumstances under which a party, who otherwise could move to compel
arbitration based on a valid agreement, waives that right by litigating the
matter in court. This issue was addressed in First Community Insurance
Co. v. F-Con Contractors, Inc.,308 a mandamus proceeding in the Dallas
Court of Appeals. In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant over a
contract dispute, and the defendant counter claimed seeking damages
and attorney's fees. After the parties had entered into a scheduling
agreement and had engaged in extensive discovery and settlement confer-
ences, the defendant moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration
clause in the parties' contract. The court held that the defendant had
waived its right to arbitration because it had substantially invoked the
301. 81 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
302. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
303. Jones, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
304, Id. at 692-93.
305. Id. at 693.
306. 79 F. Supp. 2d 730 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
307. Id. at 733.
308. No. 05-99-01088-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 1655 (Tex. App-Dallas, Mar. 14,
2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
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judicial process and because its actions had substantially prejudiced the
plaintiff.30 9
In making this fact specific determination, the court considered several
factors, such as: (1) the amount of time from the start of the litigation
until the request for arbitration; (2) the amount of litigation; and (3) evi-
dence of prejudice, including taking advantage of pretrial discovery not
available in arbitration, as well as related delay and expense. 310 Here, the
plaintiff produced evidence that it had already spent over $22,000 in liti-
gation costs; the litigation had been pending for one-and-a-half years
prior to the request for arbitration; the plaintiff had suffered a severe
diversion of cash flow while the matter was pending; and that the defen-
dant had been able to obtain discovery to which it would not have been
entitled in arbitration. 31 1 For these reasons, the court concluded that the
defendant had waived its right to arbitration.
In the case of In re Alamo Lumber Co., 312 the court granted a petition
to compel arbitration arising from an employer policy mandating arbitra-
tion for employment disputes. The employees signed an acknowledg-
ment recognizing that the employer had implemented a mandatory
arbitration program. The court held that once the employees continued
to work after the implementation of the policy, they accepted, as a matter
of contract, that all employment-related disputes must be resolved
through binding arbitration. The court granted the writ of mandamus
and ordered the trial judge to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.313 The case is noteworthy because it rejects the rationale of
Tenet Healthcare, Ltd. v. Cooper.314 The Tenet court held that an arbitra-
tion agreement for at-will employees could not be based on the illusory
promise of the employer to also settle all disputes through binding arbi-
tration. The Alamo Lumber court, however, specifically held "a period of
employment after an employee has been notified of an arbitration policy
forms a unilateral contract. '
315
A trial court's decision to compel arbitration was reversed in the man-
damus proceeding In re Jebbia316 because the trial court had failed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the applicability of the Federal
Arbitration Act prior to compelling arbitration. Specifically, even though
the employer's arbitration agreement indicated that the arbitration agree-
ment at issue was subject to the FAA, the trial court failed to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the employer was engaged in
interstate commerce-a predicate to establishing a right to arbitration
under the FAA. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the trial court's
309. Id. at *8-*9.
310. Id. at *5-*6.
311. Id. at *7-*8.
312. 23 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding).
313. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
314. 960 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd).
315. 23 S.W.3d at 581.
316. 26 S.W.3d 753 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
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order compelling arbitration and remanded the case so that the required
hearing could be conducted.
A final development worth noting emerged from the Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari in a mandatory arbitration case to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiff in that case,
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,317 completed an employment applica-
tion for the defendant, which contained a clause requiring arbitration of
all employment-related disputes. Further, the plaintiff's signature on this
agreement was a mandatory condition of her employment with the defen-
dant. After the plaintiff signed the agreement and began her employ-
ment, she filed a state law employment discrimination suit against the
defendant. The defendant moved to compel arbitration under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, and the district court granted the motion. On ap-
peal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that
the signed employment application constituted a binding employment
contract, thereby rendering the FAA inapplicable. Importantly, the court
determined that an employment contract had been created, despite a spe-
cific disclaimer in the employment application that the plaintiff's employ-
ment was to remain at-will. 318
VI. CONCLUSION
The Reeves decision predominates other employment law develop-
ments in the Survey period. Will it lead to the abolishment of summary
judgments in discrimination cases? Will courts err on the side of sending
a case to the jury rather than granting summary judgment? Will courts
ignore the decision as merely pronouncing the state of the law as it ex-
isted in Texas before the decision? These are all issues that litigants, at-
torneys, and the courts will face in the next Survey period.
317. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 120 S. C. 2004 (2000).
318. Id. at 1071-1072.
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